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FIGHTING ANTI-GAY ABUSE IN SCHOOLS:
THE OPENING APPELLATE BRIEF OF
PLAINTIFF JAMIE NABOZNY IN




In Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996), a case of
first impression, the Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals recognized the con-
stitutional right of a gay male public school student to equal protection
from anti-gay harassment and assaults. The court held that Jamie
Nabozny had stated equal protection claims against his school district and
three school principals for gender and sexual orientation discrimination
based on allegations that, because he is gay and a boy, defendants had
failed to afford him the same kinds ofprotection given to other harassed
students. At trial on remand a jury found the three school principals liable
for intentional discrimination.
Nabozny was represented on appeal and at trial on remand by
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund. Patricia M. Logue, Man-
aging Attorney of Lambda's Midwest Regional Office and an adjunct
professor of law at Northwestern University, co-authored the Seventh
Circuit brief and argued the appeal. David S. Buckel, StaffAttorney at
Lambda's Headquarters in New York with a focus on youth and school
issues, co-authored the Seventh Circuit brief. Nabozny was represented
at trial by Logue, Buckel, and cooperating attorneys from the Chicago
office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.
t In publishing this brief, the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law has made no editorial
changes other than correcting spelling errors and changing citation form to conform
with the Bluebook 16th edition.
* Managing Attorney, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Midwest Regional
Office. A.B., 1981, Brown University, J.D., 1986, Northwestern University School
of Law.
** Staff Attorney, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York. BA., 1980,
University of Rochester, J.D., 1987, Comell Law School.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The district court had original jurisdiction under (1) 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1993) based on the existence of federal questions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) and the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution;
and, (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1993) based on the deprivation of
rights of equal protection and due process under color of state law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1993). This
is an appeal of a final Order, entered October 5, 1995, granting'sum-
mary judgment to all defendants (or collectively, "school defendants")
on all causes of action.' No post-judgment motions were filed. The
notice of appeal was filed November 6, 1995.2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case about a school's failure to take meaningful steps to
end relentless physical assaults and verbal and sexual harassment of a
gay student which brought about grave emotional and physical harm
including hospitalizations and several suicide attempts. Plaintiff,
Jamie Nabozny, attended the middle school and high school of
defendant Ashland Public School District in Ashland, Wisconsin from
1987 to 1993. Defendant Mary Podlesny was principal of Ashland
Middle School. Defendants William Davis and Thomas Blauert were
principal and assistant principal, respectively, of Ashland High
School.?
Jamie filed his four-count Complaint on February 6, 19954 and
defendants filed an Answer on February 24, 1995. An Amended
Complaint was filed on April 21, 1995.6 Jamie claimed that by their
actions and inaction in response to the abuse he suffered defendants
violated his rights of due process (Count I) and equal protection
1. See Nabozny v. Podesny, No. 95-C-086-S (W.D. Wis. Oct. 5, 1995) (Order grant-
ing defendants' motion for summary judgment).
2. See R. Doc. 43. The designation "R Doc. " refers to the docket number entry for
the document in the record on appeal. SeeApp. at A-13.
3. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 3.
4. See R. Doc. 1.
5. See t- Doc. 2.
6. See tR Doc. 13.
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(Count II). Jamie additionally alleged that defendants had a policy,
custom or habit of providing unequal and inadequate care and pro-
tection to plaintiff (Count III) and that defendants were negligent
(Count V).
7
On August 15, 1995, defendants moved for summary judgment.8
On October 5, 1995, after depositions, affidavits, briefs and proposed
findings of fact were filed, the district court granted summary judg-
ment to all defendants on all counts.9 Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal
on November 6, 1995.Y0 Plaintiff did not appeal that part of the Or-
der dismissing defendant Steven Kelly. Plaintiff also does not pursue
here the dismissal of his state law claims.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether defendants' denial of protection to Jamie from
violence and harassment because he is a gay boy states
an equal protection claim, whether there are genuine is-
sues of material fact as to that claim and whether the
right underlying the claim was clearly established for
purposes of qualified immunity?
2. Whether there are genuine issues of material fact on Ja-
mie's first due process claim that the school defendants
enhanced his risk of harm from abuse?
3. Whether the school defendants' encouragement of stu-
dents to harm Jamie states a second due process claim
and whether the right underlying the claim was clearly
established for purposes of qualified immunity?
RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
7. SeeR. Doe. 13.
8. See R Doe. 23.
9. SeeNabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 5-10.
10. SeeP, Doc. 43.
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shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Plaintiff Nabozny seeks enforcement of these federal constitu-
tional rights through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in relevant
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be li-
able to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. 2
Wisconsin Statutes section 118.13 ("Pupil discrimination pro-
hibited") provides in relevant part:
(1) No person may be denied ... participation in, be denied
the benefits of or be discriminated against in any curricular,
extracurricular, pupil services, recreational or other program or
activity because of the persons sex, race, religion, national ori-
gin, ancestry, creed, pregnancy, marital or parental status,
sexual orientation or physical, mental, emotional or learning
disability.
(2)(a) Each school board shall develop written policies and
procedures to implement this section and submit them to the
state superintendent as a part of its 1986 annual report under
s. 120.18. The policies and procedures shall provide for re-
ceiving and investigating complaints by residents of the school
district regarding possible violations of this section, for mak-
ing determinations as to whether this section has been violated
and for ensuring compliance with this section."
11. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
13. Wis. STAT. § 118.13 (1)-(2)(a) (1995).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS'4
Jamie Nabozny was born October 14, 1975 in Ashland, Wiscon-
sin 5 to Carol and Robert Nabozny. As a young student, Jamie did
well in elementary school. He was a good student who got along with
everyone and never got in any kind of trouble. 6
School life changed for Jamie when he went to Ashland Middle
School for seventh and eighth grades in 1988-90 and to Ashland High
School for ninth, tenth and eleventh grades in 1990-92. Both of these
schools are part of defendant Ashland Public School District. 17 This
Statement of Facts will review Jamie's experiences of anti-gay harass-
ment and assault in each of those school years, his and his parents'
attempts to have the abuse stopped and the defendants' responses to
their requests. It will then review the School District's discipline, har-
assment and non-discrimination policies and practices and their
implementation for other students.
Seventh Grade (1988-89)
In the fall of 1988, at age 12, Jamie entered seventh grade at
Ashland Middle School. 8 It was also around this time that Jamie re-
alized he was gay.'9 His fellow students by then perceived him as gay.20
Jamie began to experience verbal anti-gay harassment at school from
14. Because this appeal is from a grant of summary judgment to defendants, the facts
(including the exact chronology of events) are presented in the light most favorable to
plaintiff Nabozny and are based upon the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, inter-
rogatory answers and admissions on file with the district court. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
These include the depositions of Jamie Nabozny ("JN Dep."), Carol Nabozny ("CN
Dep."), Robert Nabozny ("RN Dep."), Thomas Blauert ("Blauert Dep.") and Mary
Podlesny ("Podlesny Dep."). The exhibits for all depositions ("Dep. Ex. . ) are
appended to the Podlesny deposition transcript. Citations are also made to the affida-
vits of Jamie Nabozny ("JN Aff.") and Jeanne Thompson ("Thompson Aff.") and to
pleadings including the Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl."), Defendants' Response
to the Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories ("Def.'s Interrog. Resp. No. _.) and
Defendants' Answer ("Answer").
15. SeeJN Dep. at7.
16. See RN Dep. at 22; CM Dep. at 10.
17. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 2.
18. SeeJN Dep. at 7; Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 3.
19. SeeJN Aff. [ 2.
20. SeeJN Dep. at70.
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his fellow students, including epithets such as "faggot."2' He also was
physically assaulted, again because of his sexuality; he was hit, kicked
and spat upon in school hallways, bathrooms, locker rooms and other
facilities.' The verbal, sexual and physical harassment of Jamie was
ongoing.
Early that year, Jamie spoke to a school guidance counselor, Ms.
Peterson, about the name-calling and harassment. 2 In response to her
question, Jamie confirmed that he was gay.4 Peterson convened a
meeting of three harassing students and notified their parents of the
problem. She ordered the students to stop the harassment and im-
posed detention upon two of the students, which had the desired
effect, at least for a time.'
However, the harassment later resumed and Jamie spoke to Mr.
Nowakowski, the guidance counselor who succeeded Ms. Peterson26
Jamie also told Nowakowski he was gay.2' Mr. Nowakowski informed
the principal, defendant Podlesny, of the harassment. He told Jamie
that the principal would have to deal with discipline matters.28 Podle-
sny was in charge of student discipline at Ashland Middle School.
29
Sometime before Christmas, Jamie met with Nowakowski and
principal Podlesny to discuss the continuing harassment.3 At this
meeting, Jamie informed Podlesny he was gay." She said she would
take care of the problem of harassment by other students." However,
she did nothing as a result of that meeting."
The abuse continued, with Jamie going to guidance counselor
Nowakowski about once a month to "tell him what harassment was
going on by who[m] and he would relay the message to Mrs.
Podlesny."" School officials talked to two of the abusive students,
Jason Welty and Roy Grande, at some point about the harassment,
21. JN Aff. 2.
22. See e.g., JN Aff. J3.
23. SeeJN Dep. at 38.
24. SeejN Dep. at 38.
25. SeeJN Dep. at 38-40.
26. SeeJN Dep. at 42.
27. SeeJN Dep. at65.
28. SeeJN Dep. at 42, 67.
29. See Podlesny Dep. at 22, 26.
30. SeeJN Dep. at 43.
31. SeeJN Dep. at 66.
32. SeeJN Dep. at 43, 67.
33. SeeJN Dep. at 43, 67.
34. JN Dep. at 68.
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but afterwards the students informed Jamie that if he said anything
again the abuse would get worse. 5 The abuse continued, and Jamie
continued to report the harassment to Mr. Nowakowski.m
At one point, Jamie was verbally harassed and pinched in a sci-
ence classroom when the teacher left for a few minutes.37 When Jamie
tried to resist, the harassing student, Jason Welty, grabbed him and
pushed him to the floor. Welty and another student, Roy Grande,
held him down for several minutes, taunted him and acted out a mock
rape on him, while twenty other students watched and laughed.38 The
two boys told Jamie that he should like what they were doing to him,
making references to an actual sexual assault Jamie had endured from
a male adult, Nick Rising, who had been a church youth group coun-
selor.39 Rising had pled guilty to assaulting Jamie and gone to jail. 0
Grande was a friend of Rising's.
4'
When Jamie broke free from his assailants, he went directly to the
principal's office and told defendant Podlesny what had happened.42
She responded by saying that if Jamie was "going to be so openly gay,
that [he] had to expect this kind of stuff to happen." She also said
that "boys will be boys," a comment she repeated on other occasions.4
Jamie went right home but only told his mother that he was "sick."
4
He was crying and very humiliated.4
The morning after the assault, the school would not let Jamie go
to class until he spoke to a counselor, not because of the assault but
because he had left school without telling anyone he was leaving.47 He
spoke to Nowakowski and informed him of the assault, and Nowak-
owski, who was upset, spoke to Podlesny. " However, no discipline
was imposed on Jamie's harassers.
49
35. SeeJN Dep. at 68-69.
36. SeeJN Dep. at 68-69.
37. SeeJN Dep. at72.
38. See JN Aff. 4; JN Dep. at 72-73.
39. See JN Aff. 4; JN Dep. at 55, 72.
40. SeeJN Dep. at 65.
41. SeeJN Dep. at 65.
42. SeeJN Dep. at 73.
43. JN Dep. at 74, 149.
44. JN Dep. at 73-74, 149.
45. JN Dep. at 75.
46. SeeJN Dep. at75.
47. See JN Dep. at 76.
48. SeeJN Dep. at76.
49. SeeJN Af. J[ 5.
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The abuse continued, verbally and physically, on a daily basis,"
On a few of the worst days, Jamie had to call his parents to come pick
him up at school.5 On these occasions, his father recalled Jamie being
"petrified" but only later was he able to tell his parents about the
abuse which caused his terror.
52
Eighth Grade (1989-90)
The next school year, in the eighth grade, the daily verbal and
physical abuse resumed and closely mirrored that of the prior year;
name-calling of a sexual nature, hitting and spitting were common-
place.5" Jamie had by then spoken to his parents about what was going
on at school and they were very upset.5
4
Early in the year several boys, including Roy Grande's brother
Larry and a boy named John, pushed Jamie's books out of his hands,
hit him and pushed him around in a bathroom." Jamie informed his
parents of the assault that day and they requested a meeting with prin-
cipal Podlesny and the three boys and one of their parents.56 The boys
denied that anything had happened."
At this meeting, Jamie, Robert and Carol Nabozny all recall prin-
cipal Podlesny saying to them (possibly with the perpetrators of the
harassment still in the room) that ifJamie "was going to be openly gay
that [he] had to expect that kind of stuff."58 No disciplinary action was
taken against Jamie's harassers and the abuse continued unabated after
the meeting.59
All told, Jamie's parents set up meetings with school principal
Podlesny six or seven times in the course of the seventh and eighth
50. SeeJN Dep. at 78.
51. SeeRN Dep. at28.
52. RN Dep. at 28-29.
53. SeeJNAff. J 8.
54. SeeJN Dep. at 78.
55. SeeJN Dep. at 79-80.
56. SeeJN Dep. at 80; RN Dep. at 34-35.
57. SeeJN Dep. at 81.
58. JN Dep. at 81; seeako RN Dep. at 34-35 and errata; CN Dep. at 25.
Jamie's mother also testified. "He was a very shy kid. He wasn't the type that
would walk down the aisle and say, 'Hi, I'm Jamie, I'm gay.' That just wasn't him.
He was very shy and very respectful and just a good kid, so I don't know where she
was coming from with him being openly gay." CN Dep. at 29.
59. SeeJN Dep. at 82-83.
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grades and also met with Mr. Nowakowski who passed on informa-
tion' to her.60 Jamie's father recalls that the meetings were to address
name-calling (including "faggot, queer, fudge-packer"), 6' punching,
kids knocking Jamie's books out of his hands and the fact that his son
was being "tortured."6 2 The offending students were identified for
Podlesny.63 Jamie's father described the typical reason for the meetings
and the results of the meetings:
[Jamie would] come home and just really be feeling bad. He'd
go right to his room and lay on the bed and cry. He couldn't
come out for supper or anything._And we talked to him, and
then as soon as we'd get ahold of the school and talk to her,
we'd set up an appointment and we'd go in.... And we went
and then talked to her about it, and she said she would take
care of it, but nothing was-none of the kids ever did get
anything out of it. It was like once we walked out the door, we
were forgotten, you know.
64
Near the end of the eighth grade, when he was 13, Jamie was
hospitalized at Miller-Dwan Medical Center in Duluth, Minnesota,
for an extended period after an attempted suicide because of depres-
sion, fear and anxiety related to the harassment at school which he
sought to escape.65 Prior to that hospitalization he had been out of
school one and a half weeks "on the advice of the district attorney be-
cause of harassment and teasing [he was] receiving from [his] peers at
school."66
Jamie finished the eighth grade in Catholic school. There was no
Catholic high school, only a religious school unacceptable to the
Naboznys.6 Jamie therefore entered Ashland High School as a ninth
grader.
60. See RN Dep. at 41-42.
61. RN Dep. at 39.
62. RN Dep. at 37.
63. See RN Dep. at 41, 43.
64. RN Dep. at 39.
65. See JN Dep. at 28-31, 137. Although plaintiff agreed at his deposition with records
indicating that this hospitalization occurred in the ninth grade, the date and year ap-
pear to correspond with the end of eighth grade. See JN Dep. at 137.
66. JN Dep. at 137-38.
67. See CN Dep. at 45.
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Ninth Grade (1990-91)
The continual harassment and name-calling of Jamie by the
Grande brothers and others resumed in ninth grade. 8 Early on that
year, Roy Grande and Stephan Huntley assaulted Jamie while he was
in the boys' bathroom using a urinal.69 Huntley kneed Jamie in the
back of the knee and he fell "kind of into the urinal. 7 ' Grande, who
was standing next to Jamie using the urinal, then turned and urinated
on Jamie, causing a big, continuous splash on the left side of his shirt
and pants.7'
When the assault was over, Jamie went directly to the office of
principal William Davis and spoke with defendant Davis' secretary.71
Defendant Blauert, assistant principal, recalled seeing Jamie go into
Mr. Davis' office.73 Jamie was very upset and told the secretary what
had happened and that someone had urinated on him on purpose
(possibly identifying Roy Grande specifically). 7 She then called Mr.
Davis, who only said that Jamie should go home to change his
clothes.75 Jamie, then called his parents and asked his father to pick
him up from school, but told his father he did not want to talk about
what had happened.76
Several weeks later, Jamie did tell his father about the incident:
It was right before things were getting kind of bad in school. It
was right before I ended up in the hospital and I had tried to
kill myself, and we were all sitting around at the hospital
talking about why I was so depressed and that's when I told
my dad then.'
Jamie's parents then requested another meeting with the school
and met with principal Davis, assistant principal Blauert, Jamie and
possibly a guidance counselor, Mr. Reeder.7 ' They discussed the on-
68. SeeJN Dep. at 82-83, 87, 89, 90.
69. SeeJN Dep. at 83.
70. JN Dep. at 83.
71. SeeJN Dep. at 83-84.
72. SeeJN Dep. at 84.
73. See Blauert Dep. at 58.
74. SeeJN Dep. at 85, 86.
75. SeeJN Dep. at 85-86.
76. SeeJN Dep. at 86-87.
77. JN Dep. at 87-88.
78. SeeJN Dep. at 89-90.
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going harassment, including the "urination incident, the name calling,
the harassment in [his] classes, the harassment in gym." At that
meeting, it was clear that Mr. Davis already knew of the urination in-
cident. 0 However, no one had investigated and no action was ever
taken against Grande or Hundey.8"
Instead, the school responded by sending Jamie to Mr. Reeder's
office for the purpose of switching his classes around to avoid classes
with the harassing students."2 This was ineffective because most of the
assaults took place in the common areas and bathrooms which Jamie
continued to share with the abusive students, and many of the abusive
students were still in Jamie's classes.83 The harassment continued re-
lentdessly8
Later, the school put Jamie into a "special education" class, where
he spent all day in one classroom. 5 Rather than make him safer, this
put Jamie in the same room with the "troublemakers" all day.86 For
example, Stephan Huntley and Roy Grande were special education
students."'
After the assault by Huntiey and Grande and other incidents,
Jamie feared using the school's bathrooms and stopped doing so for
an extended period to avoid further assaults.88 Some time later, Jamie
asked the home economics teacher, Nina Anderson, for permission to
use the bathroom in her classroom. 9 After he recounted what had
happened and his fears, she granted his request Jamie spent the rest
of his time at the high school using this separate bathroom rather than
those used by other students.9'
On another occasion in a ninth grade math classroom, students
verbally harassed Jamie, pushed his things off his desk and laughed at
him.92 The teacher got upset at Jamie, called him a "fag" and told him
79. JN Dep. at 90.
80. SeeJN Dep. at 90.
81. SeeJNAff. 112.
82. SeeJN Dep. at 91.
83. See, e.g., JN Dep. at 92.
84. See JN Aff. 9.
85. See RN Dep. at 55.
86. RN Dep. at 55.
87. SeeJN Dep. at 97; Blauert Dep. at 43.
88. SeeJNAff. J[ 12;JNDep. at93.
89. SeeJN Dep. at 93.
90. SeeJN Dep. at 93.
91. SeeJN Dep. at 124.
92. See JN Dep. at 125.
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to get out of the class and get reassigned to another class.93 The stu-
dents laughed at the teacher's remarks.4 Jamie left the class and went
to see Mr. Reeder about being reassigned. 5
Three or four times during the ninth grade, Jamie's parents met
with school officials, including the principal, Mr. Davis, and the as-
sistant principal, Mr. Blauert.9 According to Jamie's father, "[elvery
time we left any of the meetings we felt something was going to be
resolved, and it never went any farther."9 Carol Nabozny also spoke
to Blauert several times and to Davis by phone several times about the
"[n]ame-calling, tripping, knocking [of] books out of [Jamie's] hands"
and other harassment.98 She identified specific offenders to Davis.99 In
those conversations, Davis said that he would take care of the harass-
ment problem."°°
In the middle of ninth grade, Jamie again attempted suicide.'
He was admitted to Ashland Memorial Medical Center in Ashland
and diagnosed with depression because of the harassment at school.0 2
Because of the continual and escalating abuse, Jamie's parents then
sent Jamie to live with relatives and attend another school in another
town for several months.0 3 However, after a falling out in which his
uncle told Jamie that he did not approve of his being gay, Jamie ran
away to Minneapolis.'04
Jamie's parents went to Minneapolis and located him.0 5 Jamie
did not want to come back to Ashland because of the verbal abuse and
beatings at school and his fears about returning there.' His parents
only persuaded Jamie to come home by promising that some ar-
rangement would be worked out so that he would not have to go back
93. JN Dep. at 125.
94. SeeJN Dep. at 125.
95. SeeJN Dep. at 126.
96. See RN Dep. at 49.
97. RN Dep. at 54.
98. CN Dep. at 33, 38-39.
99. See CN Dep. at 40.
100. SeeCN Dep. at39.
101. See CN Dep. at 31.
102. SeeJN Dep. at 29-30.
103. SeeJNAff. J 11; CN Dep.'at 35.
104. See CN Dep. at 35-36; JN Dep. at 51.
105. See RN Dep. at 60-61.
106. See RN Dep. at 61.
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to Ashland High School.""' "He wanted to come home, but only if he
didn't have to go to Ashland High School."'08
Jamie's parents could not afford home schooling.'0 At some
point, Jamie's parents tried to arrange for him to live with another
family in Ashland that was already conducting home schooling for
their children, but the arrangement failed after a short time."" Even-
tually, government officials from the Department of Social Services
told Robert Nabozny that he was required to return Jamie to Ashland
High School.' After returning there in ninth grade, Jamie endured
never-ending verbal and physical assaults of a sexual nature.112
Tenth and Eleventh Grades (1991-92)
In tenth grade, the assaults against Jamie became more violent
and physically abusive, including being grabbed in the crotch and
bitten in the rear end."3 Jamie's family had moved to his grandpar-
ents' home between ninth and tenth grades which was farther from
the school and required him to ride the school bus 2-3 miles." 4
Jamie was regularly abused on the school bus, both verbally and
physically." 5 He was assigned to sit in the back of the bus, and two
brothers who sat near him regularly called him anti-gay epithets such
as "fag," "queer" and other names." 6 The verbal harassment was daily
and loud enough for the driver to hear and the throwing of items at
Jamie, such as nuts and bolts, occurred "almost all the time.
" ' 7
Jamie eventually informed his parents about the abuse in the back
of the bus-to explain his refusal to ride it anymore-and they spoke
to the school."' The response was to move Jamie to an assigned seat at
the front of the bus "out of place ... with grade schoolers. '... The
107. See CN Dep. at 67-68; RN Dep. at 61.
108. CN Dep. at 67.
109. See CN Dep. at 69.
110. See RN Dep. at 63.
111. SeeRN Dep. at64.
112. SeeJN Aff. J[ 11.
113. SeeJN Aff. ' 12.
114. SeeJN Dep. at 110; CN Dep. at 55.
115. See CN Dep. at 57; JN Dep. at 110, 115; JN Aff. R 10.
116. JN Dep. at 111.
117. JN Dep. at 113-15.
118. SeeCN Dep. at 58; JN Dep. at 118.
119. JN Dep. at 119-20.
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harassment continued in the form of the older children telling the
younger children not to sit next to Jamie, that he would molest them
and that he was perverted. 2 These things were said loud enough for the
bus driver to hear but she did nothing.'' Jamie also daily reported the
harassment in the front of the bus to his guidance counselor, Lynn Han-
son.'" Finally, Jamie stopped riding the bus and started to walk two to
three miles each way to school or get there by other means."
Jamie spoke frequently with Hanson about the harassment at the
school and on the bus.' 2' She spoke to school administrators in an effort
to have the problems addressed but was frustrated because "nobody was
willing to do anything."' According to Jamie's father, Hanson."did her
damnedest, but once it got above her, that's as far as it went.
" 126
Jamie was very suicidal in tenth grade and made his most serious
attempt at suicide early that year.Y He felt like "I was going to kill my-
self, or I wanted to leave the school, one or the other."' After his
attempt to kill himself, he was admitted to Memorial Medical Center in
Ashland. 29 He subsequently returned to school.
During tenth grade, Jamie was also the victim of another brutal as-
sault by Stephan Huntley in a school hallway.' 0 During the time Jamie
was walking to school he tried to get to school in the morning "earlier
than everybody else so that I would get into the building and into the
library before people got there." 3' One day when Jamie arrived early to
get into the library-
... the library lights weren't on yet, so I sat in the back hall-
way waiting for the librarian to get there, and Stephan
Huntley and some other boys came down the hallway. There
was about eight or nine of them. And Stephan-he called me
a name and kicked my books out from my lap, and he told
120. See JN Dep. at 120.
121. SeeJN Dep. at 120.
122. See JN Dep. at 121. Although conversations with guidance counselors are generally
confidential, the counselor is supposed to report allegations such as sexual harassment
which are not kept confidential. See Blauert Dep. at 49-50.
123. SeeCN Dep. at 58, 61; JN Aff. J[ 10.
124. See, e.g., JN Dep. at 122.
125. JN Dep. at 121-22. See also RN Dep. at 57.
126. RN Dep. at 57.
127. SeeJN Dep. at 30-31.
128. JN Dep. at 30.
129. See JN Dep. at 30-31.
130. SeeJN Dep. at 95-96.
131. JN Dep. at 95.
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me-he said he wanted to fight, and I said that I wasn't going
to fight him. And he said, "If you're not going to fight me,
then I'll just kick the shit out of you." And I got up and I
started to pick up my books, and he kicked me in the stom-
ach. And then he continued to kick me in the stomach, and
then they left when the lights turned on in the library ....
The kickihg lasted five to ten minutes, 13 while the other boys were
standing around watching and laughing.'m After the assault ended, Ja-
mie went to the library and started to feel sick, so he went to the
principal's office and called home.
35
Jamie had stomach pain for three days and stayed out of school.
36
He did not tell his parents about the assault at that time.'37 When Jamie
returned to school, he told his counselor, Ms. Hanson, exactly what had
happened.33 Hanson referred Jamie to the school's police liaison, Dan
Crawford, who maintained an office at the school.'39 Jamie spoke to
Crawford and told him he wanted to press charges, but Crawford dis-
suaded him by promising that he would speak to the abusive students
and that it would stop. 40 Some minor punishment was imposed on
some students but at least three of the principal abusers, including
Huntley, Roy Grande and Ryan Goulan, continued the abuse. 4' Sus-
pensions were not imposed.
42
Jamie had continuous cramps and stomach pains until two to three
weeks later when he collapsed from abdominal pain in class and an
ambulance picked him up at school and he was hospitalized.4 3 Jamie
required abdominal surgery.'" He had internal bleeding and bruising."'
Jamie told his parents in his hospital room that he had been kicked
repeatedly in the stomach at school and that "[o]ne had cowboy boots
132. JN Dep. at 95-96.
133. SeeJN Dep. at 98.
134. See JN Dep. at 96.
135. SeeJN Dep. at 99.
136. SeeJN Dep. at 101.
137. SeeJN Dep. at 102.
138. SeeJN Dep. at 102.
139. SeeJN Dep. at 102-03.
140. SeeJN Dep. at 103-05.
141. SeeJN Dep. at 103-05.
142. SeeJN Dep. at 106.
143. SeeJN Dep. at 33, 107-08; RN Dep. at 68.
144. See RN Dep. at 68; JN Dep. at 107-08.
145. See RN Dep. at 32.
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on."M' As of his 1995 deposition, Jamie was continuing to have frequent
stomachaches and had recently been rehospitalized for internal bleeding
and throwing up blood.'
7
During Jamie's tenth and eleventh grade years, he spoke on at least
three or four occasions with the assistant principal, Mr. Blauert, re-
garding the harassment.4 Jamie initially went to Blauert because the
police liaison, Dan Crawford, told him he had to speak to Blauert as
well as him about what was going on."' He continued to go to Blauert
because "[i]f I had a complaint and went to the office, I was told to go
to Mr. Blauert. He was in charge of disciplining.""'
Jamie recalled that Blauert "didn't respond very well to the things I
would tell him. He laughed at me. He was another person who told me
that if I wasn't-that I was kind of deserving what I was getting because
of the fact that I was gay.""' At his deposition, Jamie further testified:
Q. What exactly did [Blauert] say when you got the mes-
sage that Mr. Blauert felt you were deserving of what you were
getting?
A. I was telling him about being called names and the har-
assment and stuff, and he just looked at me, and he laughed
and he said-he goes, "Well, if you're,oing to be gay, this
kind of stuff is going to happen to you.
Jamie asked Blauert to stop the harassment and Blauert said he
would deal with it." Blauert's typical response was that Jamie was initi-
ating the trouble or provoking the perpetrators.)'5 Jamie also
experienced delay in waiting to discuss with Mr. Davis an assault he had
just suffered, when a female student who came to the office after him
was taken in to see Mr. Davis first.15
Jamie's parents also "made quite a few phone calls to the school
with complaints that.., he would come home and had bruises and be
146. CN Dep. at 70.
147. SeeJN Dep. at 34-36.
148. SeeJN Dep. at 146.
149. SeeJN Dep. at 145, 147.
150. JN Dep. at 147; see alto Def.'s Interrog. Resp. No. 4; Blauert Dep. at 21, 36, 42.
151. JN Dep. at 144.
152. JN Dep. at 145.
153. SeeJN Dep. at 146.
154. SeeJN Aff. 114.
155. See JN Aff. 118.
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beat up."' 56 Many of these calls were to Lynn Hanson who said she
would take their concerns through channels."7 Jamie's mother also
recalled speaking to Mr. Blauert several times regarding the name-
calling and harassment."' Principal Davis referred the Naboznys to
Blauert." Blauert assured the Naboznys "he would take care of it. He
would do something about it."'
According to Jamie's mother, Lynn Hanson had "asked for help
and asked for help for this kid, and nothing was being done to stop the
other kids from doing what they were doing to him." 6' At a meeting
attended by Carol Nabozny, Hanson "said that she had tried to help a
gay student at Ashland High and that she went as far as the superinten-
dent and even higher and th[at] nobody would help."
162
Finally, in December of his eleventh grade year, Jamie could no
longer tolerate the stress and fear of going to school and decided to drop
out and leave Ashland.'63 The Naboznys met with Hanson and she told
Jamie it would be best for him to find alternative schooling options
which might include leaving Ashland.'" According to his father:
He just flat refused to go back to school. And we told him that
we could understand why, but he should still stick it out and
finish it. And we talked to Lynn Hanson about it, and she told
us that she was at the top of her ladder and couldn't go any
farther. The district wouldn't do anything about it, and we
should just let him go.'
65
Jamie moved to Minnesota and sought the help of a therapist.'"
After leaving Ashland, Jamie was diagnosed with Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) because of the harassment he suffered at the
Ashland schools.' 67 He pursued his education in the Minneapolis area,
but riding a bus and being in classrooms became too difficult because of
PTSD and, in 1994, Jamie obtained his GED rather than a high school
156. RN Dep. at 64.
157. See RN Dep. at 67-68.
158. See CN Dep. at 52.
159. SeeJN Aff. J[ 14.
160. CN Dep. at 52.
161. CN Dep. at 66.
162. CN Dep. at 64; see aso RN Dep. at 57.
163. See JN Aff.J 15; CN Dep. at 51.
164. SeeJNAff. J 15.
165. RN Dep. at 72-73.
166. SeeJNAff. J 16.
167. SeeJN Dep. at 8.
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diploma.'68 Jamie's therapy for depression and PTSD are ongoing.169 In
the summer of 1994, the depression worsened and Jamie again became
somewhat suicidal. He was admitted to the University of Minnesota Hos-
pital on August 31, 1994 and remained an in-patient for a month.' 70
School Harassment Polices and Incidents Involving Other Students
Since July 27, 1987, the School District has had in effect a Non-
Discrimination Policy implementing state law forbidding, inter alia,
sexual orientation and sex discrimination in curricular, extra-curricular,
pupil services, recreational or other school programs."' During the years
that Jamie was a student, the School District required that all students
be protected from sexual harassment, including student-on-student har-
assment and harassment directed at gay and lesbian students."'72 The
sexual harassment and school non-discrimination policies were included
in the student handbook which is distributed and discussed at the be-
ginning of the year.'73 Students were to be held accountable for
complying with policies in the handbook.'74
According to school policies, all school rules of behavior remained
in effect on the bus, enforceable by the driver.' 7' The privilege of riding
on the bus was to be withdrawn for unacceptable behavior, including
using profane language or other discourteous behavior.'76 The school
was supposed to "make[ I every effort to avoid injury and accident to
pupils" on the bus.'7
School disciplinary penalties could include, at least, "detention, in-
school suspension, out-of-school suspension [or] expulsion."77 Referrals
168. SeeJN Dep. at 19-23.
169. See JNAff J[ 16.
170. SeeJN Dep. at 25-27.
171. SeeThompsonAff. 1 5, Fx A. Wis. STAT. § 118.13 (1995).
172. SeeThompson Af. T 5, Ex. A; Blauerr Dep. at 27; Def.'s Interrog. Resp. No. 5; Answer
9134,36.
173. See Blauert Dep. at 37-38; Dep. Ex. 1.
174. See Blauert Dep. at 40.
175. See Dep. Ex. 1 at 181. At school, for example, use of the word "fig" was supposed to
bring "disciplining from a warning to detention, suspension, parents, to whatever I
thought was necessary because then that's unacceptable language and it will not be put
up with and not tolerated." Blauert Dep. at 52-53.
176. SeeDep. Ex. I at 181.
177. Dep. Ex. 1 at 181.
178. Blauert Dep. at 26 and errata.
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to the police liaison for possible criminal charges could follow discipline
for sexual harassment.'" Defendant Mary Podlesny was in charge of
student discipline at Ashland Middle School. 8 When she received a
complaint of sexual harassment, for example, Podlesny would investi-
gate, find out what was happening and try to resolve the problem."
Defendant Thomas Blauert was in charge of student discipline at Ash-
land High School, induding investigating complaints of sexual
harassment, and communicating behavioral expectations to the student
body. 182
Defendants admitted that they took immediate action through dis-
cipline when they learned that female students were discriminated
against on the basis of their gender.'83 Jamie has personal knowledge of
classroom incidents in which boys were reprimanded and subsequently
disciplined for physically assaulting girls.'" For example, a student who
hit his girlfriend was immediately expelled.'85 Jamie also has personal
knowledge of incidents in which boys who made sexually harassing
comments to girls were reprimanded and disciplined. 8 When pregnant
girls were called names such as "slut," "whore" or "fat," defendants im-
posed immediate detentions and suspensions.18 Jamie was never
informed by school officials of a sexual harassment or anti-
discrimination policy.' 88
SuMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Jamie Nabozny raises quintessential Section 1983 claims against
the school defendants and there are genuine issues of material fact re-
quiring trial on those claims. In Monroe v. Pape,'89 the Supreme Court
noted that it was "the failure of certain States to enforce the laws with
an equal hand that furnished the powerful momentum behind"9 ' the
179. See Blauert Dep. at 43.
180. See Def.'s Interrog. Resp. No. 4; Podlesny Dep. at 22, 26.
181. See Podlesny Dep. at 50.
182. See Def.'s Interrog. Resp. No. 4; Blauert Dep. at 21, 36, 42-43.
183. See Answer 1134.
184. SeeJN Aff. [ 17.
185. See Am. Compl. J 33.
186. SeeJNAff. J 17.
187. See Am. Compl. 33.
188. SeeAm. Compl. 19.
189. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
190. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174-75.
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passage of Section 1983. The particular concern then, as now, was state
governmental indifference to harassment and violence.
While the defendants and the State of Wisconsin have laws and
policies to address the assaults and harassment endured by Jamie in the
Ashland schools, they also had a custom, policy or practice of not en-
forcing those remedies for this student. Their failure to expel Jamie's
attackers or otherwise stop the abuse of him is explained by discrimina-
tory and-gay and gender-based animus and by deliberate indifference.
Section 1983 provides Jamie a remedy for the great harm caused by this
deprivation of his equal protection and due process rights.
After the standard of review applicable to the district court's grant
of summary judgment is set forth in Section I of the Argument, Section
II advances an equal protection claim based on the school defendants'
failure to impose meaningful discipline on Jamie's abusers or to take
other steps to stop the relentless anti-gay harassment and violence he
endured from identified students. While the school acted immediately
and decisively in defense of girls assaulted by boyfriends and others, it
usually did nothing in response to vicious assaults on Jamie, literally
telling him he had to learn to expect them as a gay boy. Any steps that
were taken-such as verbal reprimands for violent physical assaults-
were obviously inadequate to stop the harassment. In short, Jamie seeks
a very literal form of equal protection of the laws.
Part A of Section II details the constitutional basis for Jamie's equal
protection claim and its application to all vulnerable minorities. It also
traces a long series of cases recognizing the right Jamie asserts, demon-
strating that qualified immunity is unwarranted for the individual
defendants because the right is dearly established. Part B of Section II
reviews the significant record evidence of discriminatory intent, estab-
lishing that there are genuine issues of material fact which remain and
warrant reversal and trial.
Section III advances two due process claims under this Circuit's
law, both based upon school officials' deliberate indifference to
Jamie's liberty interest in personal security. Part A of Section III
asserts that the school defendants' actions and inaction "enhanced the
risk of harm" to Jamie. Their four-year failure to discipline the
abusive students, combined with the message sent to those students by
the school's segregation of Jamie, rendered him more vulnerable to
abuse. The district court recognized the legal basis for such a claim
but wrongly entered judgment for defendants for lack of evidence.
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The evidence of record, viewed most favorably to Jamie, demonstrates
genuine issues for trial.
Part B of Section III asserts a second due process claim in that these
policies and practices of the school defendants unconstitutionally
"encouraged a climate" in which Jamie would be harmed. The Court is
asked to reject the district court's holding that a school can only be
responsible for fomenting such a climate if teachers, not students, are
the ones encouraged to behave abusively. This reasoning is a remnant of
vicarious liability theory that has no application in Section 1983 cases.
Jamie further asserts that the due process right of students to be free
from abuse was dearly established at the time these defendants caused
harm to him and therefore they should not escape liability under
qualified immunity principles.
ARGUMENT
1. THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
THE MERITS AND ON THE BASIS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IS
SUBJECT TO DE NOVO REVIEW; THE PRESENCE OF GENUINE IS-
SUES OF MATERIAL FACT REQUIRES REVERSAL.
The district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants is
subject to de novo review by this Court. 9' Summary judgment is
appropriate only when, based on the pleadings, depositions,
interrogatory answers, affidavits and admissions on file, there is an
absence of a genuine issue of any material fact."2 The evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff Jamie Nabozny, the
nonmovant, and must be assessed in light of the evidentiary burdens
imposed by the substantive law.'93 Because he bears the burden of proof
at trial, plaintiff must offer specific evidence providing a factual basis for
relief.'94
This case turns on the actions and inaction of the school defen-
dants in response to the abuse and harassment suffered by Jamie at the
hands of fellow students over many years. The daims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994) assert violations of equal protection and substantive due
191. See Roger v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 21 F.3d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1994).
192. See Roger, 21 F.3dat 148; FED. R. Crw. P. 56(c).
193. See Roger, 21 F.3d at 148.
194. See Roger, 21 F.3d at 148.
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process rights. Summary judgment was improperly granted because de-
fendants have admitted that their actions were taken under color of
law,195 and Jamie presented facts demonstrating that defendants de-
prived him of rights, privileges or immunities guaranteed by the federal
Constitution."'s As to his equal protection claim, Jamie also presented
ample evidence supporting a finding of discriminatory intent.9 7
Defendants Podlesny, Blauert and Davis asserted that even if Ja-
mie's claims survive against the School District, they are entitled to
qualified immunity from individual liability. Thus, to avoid dismissal of
these defendants, Jamie additionally showed that the rights he seeks to
vindicate were "dearly established statutory ... rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known" as of "the time [the] action
occurred." 9 ' The district court's rulings that he did not do so were
based on interpretations of law and should be reviewed de novo.'99
II. JAMIE'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED PROTECTION FROM
HARM BECAUSE HE IS A GAY BOY STATED A VALID EQUAL PRO-
TECTION CLAIM BASED ON CLEARLY ESTABLISHED CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS AND JAMIE DEMONSTRATED GENUINE IS-
SUES FOR TRIAL ON THAT CLAIM.
A. Jamie Had An Equal Protection Right Not to be
Denied Protection From Harm Because of His
Sexual Orientation or Gender; Reasonable Offi-
cials Would Have Known That Failing to Protect
Him Was Unconstitutional.
1. Jamie stated a valid equal protection
claim.
It has long been established that a state may not deny some citizens
protection from harm that it affords to others or selectively enforce
protective statutes based on membership in a minority group without
195. See Answer 9.
196. SeeWebb v. City of Chester, 813 F.2d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 1986).
197. See Webb, 813 F.2d at 828.
198. Harlowv. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
199. See Triad Associates, Inc. v. Robinson, 10 F.3d 492,495 (7th Cir. 1993).
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running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause."* Contrary to the district
court's holding, 0' Jamie's allegations that, because he is a gay boy, his
requests for protection from violence and harassment were effectively
ignored, state a valid equal protection daim under Section 1983.202
In DeShaney,03 the Court affirmed this Court's refusal, under
substantive due process principles, to hold the Winnebago County
Department of Social Services liable for failing to remove a child from
his abusive father's custody. But the Court specifically noted that
there had been no allegation that the State's failure to protect Joshua
DeShaney was attributable to animus against him because of his
membership in a group and expressly recognized that "[t]he State may
not, of 'course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfa-
vored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause."2°
The Court in DeShaney cited the 1886 case of Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins20 5 as the progenitor of this principle. In ick Wo, which
concerned selective enforcement of laws only against Chinese laundry
owners, the Court held that:
[t]hough the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in ap-
pearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practi-
cally to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.
2 6
In this case, the school defendants failed to protect Jamie from
brutal assaults and continual harassment because of their own
discriminatory animus,2 07 The State's failure to provide minorities
200. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3
(1989); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
201. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 9.
202. The district court's equal protection holding reached only Jamie's gender claim. For
unexplained reasons, the district court did not acknowledge or rule upon Jarnie's sex-
ual orientation claim. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 9. This claim was well pled,
see Am. Compl. 9 31-37, and specifically addressed by defendants in their sum-
mary judgment memorandum. See R. Doc. 24 at 5-7.
203. See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 202.
204. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 n.3.
205. SeeYickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
206. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74; see also Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)
(selective enforcement of state laws is unconstitutional where based on "arbitrary clas-
sification").
207. See infta Section II.B.
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protection from violence and harassment is the very type of
discrimination sought to be addressed by Section 1983.0 In Monroe,
the Court traced the history of Section 1983's enactment as part of
the 1871 Civil Rights Act. Extensive legislative history documented a
strong Congressional intent to provide recourse when a state
unconstitutionally fails to protect some classes of citizens from
violence and harassment, then by the Ku Klux Klan, while seeking out
and punishing those who attack other classes of citizens.2'" As
Representative Burchard of Illinois explained:
But if the statutes show no discrimination, yet in its judicial
tribunals one class is unable to secure that enforcement of
their rights and punishment for their infraction which is ac-
corded to another, or if secret combinations of men are
allowed by the Executive to band together to deprive one class
of citizens of their legal rights without a proper effort to dis-
cover, detect, and punish the violations of law and order, the
State has not afforded to all its citizens the equal protection of
the laws.
210
Or, as Representative Beatty of Ohio put it:
[M]en were murdered, houses were burned, women were out-
raged, men were scourged, and officers- of the law shot down;
and the State made no successful effort to bring the guilty to
punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged
and innocent. The State, from lack of power or inclination,
practically denied the equal protection of the law to these per-
211sons.
This Court has frequently reiterated the continuing vitality of
these principles. In Jackson, the Court considered the sufficiency of
equal protection claims alleging that government actors had failed to
assist or had negligently botched a rescue of travelers in a burning car.
In finding that no claim was stated because there was no allegation
that help was withheld because the victims "belong[ed] to a group to
208. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174-83 (1961). The additional holding in Mon-
roe that local governments are immune from suit under Section 1983 was overturned
in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Sew., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
209. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174-83.
210. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176-77.
211. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175.
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which [defendants] were hostile,"212 Judge Posner noted: "If the
defendants had withheld protection from the plaintiffs' decedents
because they were blacks or members of some other vulnerable
minority-if the defendants were discriminating in a vicious or
irrational fashion-there would be an equal protection issue."2,3
Many other cases also have held that selective enforcement or the
failure to enforce a law because of purposeful discrimination between• • t . 214
persons or classes is an actionable equal protection violation.
While the level of scrutiny accorded government discrimination
might vary with the target of its animus, 25 no contention has been
made that any rational, let alone substantial, justification supports
providing Jamie less protection from criminal assaults or harassment
because he is a gay boy. Wisconsin not only outlaws battery, 16 but the
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell"7 also has upheld its law en-
hancing the penalties for battery motivated by bias, including bias
against the victim's sexual orientation or gender, real or perceived.1 s
Wisconsin also forbids gender and sexual orientation discriminationin edcatioal. 219
in educational services, and the School District purports to protect
212. Jackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
213. Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203; see also Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1447 (7th Cir.
1984) ("The case would be a different one if the selection of firehouses to close dur-
ing the pendency of the strike had been done on a discriminatory basis"); Hawk v.
Perillo, 642 F. Supp. 380, 384 (N.D. I11. 1985) (failure of police to investigate and
pursue assailants because victim of beating was black stated equal protection daim);
Lowers v. City of Streator, 627 F. Supp. 244, 246 (N.D. MU. 1985) (allegation that
police failed to arrest rapist and continue investigation because victim was a woman
stated equal protection daim).
214. See, e.g., Muckway v. Craft, 789 F.2d 517, 522-23 (7th Cir. 1986) (county's failure
to enforce zoning ordinance actionable if intentional or purposeful discrimination
between dasses present); Qlshock v. Village of Skokie, 541 F.2d 1254, 1258-60 (7th
Cir. 1976) (selective discipline of police officers improperly based on whether repre-
sented by an attorney); United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 618-21 (7th Cir. 1973)
(selective enforcement of draft laws improperly based on political views).
215. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (sexual orienta-
tion dassifications subject to at least rational basis scrutiny); Bohen v. City of East
Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986) (gender dassifications subject to
heightened scrutiny).
216. See Wis. STAT. § 940.19 (1996).
217. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
218. See Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1) (1996).
219. See Wis. STAT. § 118.13 (1997).
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all students, regardless of gender or sexual orientation, from sexual
harassment by other students. "0
-Jamie plainly stated a constitutional daim for relief and therefore
the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this basis.2'
2. Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity.
Likewise, defendants Podlesny, Blauert and Davis should not
have received qualified immunity from the district court." Since the
nineteenth century and certainly at all times relevant to this lawsuit
(from fall 1988 to December 1992, when Jamie was in seventh
through eleventh grades), it has been clearly established that state ac-
tors may not properly withhold protection from violence and
harassment or fail to enforce laws because of discriminatory animus
toward "blacks or members of some other vulnerable minority."
m
Contrary to the reasoning of the district court,24 there is no re-
quirement that Jamie point to a factually identical case to meet the
"clearly established right" standard.2" It is enough that reasonable
school officials would have known as of 1988 that it was unconstitu-
tional to deny Jamie protection from harm because of his gender or
sexual orientation.226 The varied cases and legislative history cited
above leave no doubt that the equal protection right Jamie seeks to
vindicate was clearly established at all relevant times.
220. See Thompson Af. ![ 5, Ex. A; Blauert Dep. at 27; DOE's Interrog. Resp. No. 5;
Answer, 1[ 34, 36.
221. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 9.
222. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 9. The School District is not eligible for qualifled
immunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980). The dis-
trict court's reference to granting qualified immunity to "defendants," Nabozny, No.
95-C-086-S, at 9, is imprecise or inaccurate as only individual officials can seek
qualified immunity. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 653.
223. Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203.
224. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 9.
225. See Triad Assoc., Inc. v. Robinson, 10 F.3d 492, 498-99 (7th Cir. 1993); McDonald
v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 293 (7th Cir. 1992).
226. See TriadAssoc., 10 F.3d at 498-99.
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B. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Preclude Summary
Judgment on Jamie's Equal Protection Claim;
Jamie Provided Significant Evidence of Dis-
criminatory Intent.
The facts reviewed above demonstrate at least a genuine issue for
trial as to whether defendants failed to provide Jamie with meaningful
protection from verbal, physical and sexual harassment. It is also ad-
mitted that these protections were provided to others,' and promised
by law regardless of gender or sexual orientation."' The power to im-
pose meaningfil discipline was also plainly within the defendants'
authority. 9
The commonly missing "genuine issue" in section 1983 equal
protection claims---discriminatory intent-is also well documented in
the record here, especially when vieWed most favorably to plaintiff
Nabozny.2 Jamie provided direct evidence of discriminatory animus
by defendants and abundant evidence of a pattern and practice of
failing adequately to address his need for protection from the harm
being inflicted upon him for being a gay boy. The record shows that
defendants took seriously complaints of harassment and assault of girls
but, even in the face of quite brutal assaults, never seriously acted to
protect Jamie from harm. In the face of these damning facts, it was
error to ignore Jamie's claim based on sexual orientation animus and
to grant summary judgment on his gender bias claim for lack of evi-
dence.2"
There is ample direct evidence of anti-gay discriminatory intent
in the record. Defendant Podlesny, principal of Ashland Middle
School and in charge of discipline there, 2 2 told Nabozny to his face in
seventh grade that if he was "going to be so openly gay, that [he] had
to expect this kind of stuff to happen.""3 This comment was in re-
sponse to Nabozny immediately reporting that he had been pinned
down on a classroom floor for several minutes while students on top
227. See, e.g., Answer [ 34.
228. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1) (1996); Answer IN 34, 36.
229. See, e.g., Blauert Dep. at 26 and errata.
230. See Roger v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 21 F.3d at 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1994).
231. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 9.
232. See Podlesny Dep. at 22, 26.
233. JN Dep. at 74, 149.
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of him pretended to rape him and twenty others watched." No disci-
pline was imposed on Jamie's harassers even after a guidance
counselor spoke to Podlesny about the incident."
A later incident in the eighth grade similarly revealed the anti-gay
discriminatory animus of the school defendants. Jamie informed his
parents of an assault in which several boys hit him, pushed him
around in a bathroom and knocked his books out of his hands." His
parents requested a meeting with Podlesny, the offenders and their
parents. As she had a year earlier, despite unrelenting abuse in the in-
tervening time, Podlesny responded that if Jamie "was going to be
openly gay that [he] had to expect that kind of stuff." 7 This remark
was made to Jamie and his parents, possibly with the perpetrators and
one of their parents still present.2 8 Again, no disciplinary action was
taken.
Similarly, defendant Blauert, who was in charge of pupil disci-
pline at Ashland High, 9 laughed at Jamie's reports of harassment and
name-calling and accused him of provoking them. He directly stated
to Jamie that "if you're going to be gay, this kind of stuff is going to
happen to you."20 Blauert also told Jamie he was "deserving [of] what
I was getting because of the fact that I was gay."24
The record also shows that guidance counselor Lynn Hanson was
frustrated in her attempts to help Jamie--eventually agreeing with
him that he should drop out-because he was gay. For example, she
stated publicly that "she had tried to help a gay student at Ashland
High and that she went as far as the superintendent and even higher
and th[at] nobody would help." 22
These various admissions and statements demonstrate that anti-
gay discriminatory animus-the belief that Jamie should be denied
meaningfil protection because he is gay-was behind the school de-
fendants' failure to protect him. At the very least, Jamie has raised a
234. See JN Dep. at 72-73.
235. SeeJN Af. J[ 5.
236. SeeJN Dep. at 79-80.
237. JN Dep. at 81; see also CN Dep. at 25; RN Dep. at 34-35 and errata.
238. SeeJN Dep. at 81; CN Dep. at 25; RN Dep. at 34-35 and errata.
239. See Def.'s Interrog. Resp. No. 4; Blauert Dep. at 21, 36,42.
240. JN Dep. at 145.
241. JN Dep. at 144.
242. CN Dep. at 64; see also RN Dep. at 57.
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genuine issue of material fact that entitles him to trial on his equal
protection claim.
24
Contrary to the district court's conclusion,2" there is also signifi-
cant evidence from which a jury could conclude that gender bias
motivated defendants' treatment of Jamie. Jamie had personal knowl-
edge of incidents in which a male student who hit his girlfriend was
immediately expelled 4' and boys were reprimanded and disciplined
for physically assaulting girls.2" Likewise, boys who made sexually
harassing comments to girls would be reprimanded and disciplined.2 47
When pregnant girls were called names such as "slut," "whore" or
"fat," defendants imposed immediate detentions and suspensions.248
All defendants admitted that they "took or at least tried to take
immediate action through discipline if and when it was brought to
their attention that female students were discriminated against on the
basis of their gender."2 9 They steadfastly maintained that their usual
practice was to investigate claims of sexual harassment immediately,
take them seriously and seek to resolve them.250
But as she did on other occasions, Podlesny dismissed even the
very serious incident of mock rape and sexual harassment of Jamie
with the comment that "boys will be boys"-suggesting that a boy
student could not expect protection from such harms inflicted by
other boys. 5 Davis and Blauert took no action against Roy Grande
and Stephan Huntley for assaulting and urinating on Jamie in a re-
stroom although he went right to their office and his parents later met
with them.252 No suspensions, let alone expulsions or criminal charges,
were leveled against Stephan Huntley for kicking Jamie in the stom-
ach so brutally that he ultimately required abdominal surgery.2"
243. See Roger, 21 F.3d at 149; Webb v. City of Chester, 813 F.2d 824, 829 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that plaintiff presented evidence of discriminatory intent in Section
1983 claim and trial judge appropriately ruled that credibility issues were for the
jury); Van Houdnos v. Evans, 807 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
plaintiff presented enough evidence to send issue of discriminatory intent to jury).
244. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 9.
245. See Am. Compl. J 33.
246. SeeJNAff. [ 17.
247. SeeJNAff. 17.
248. SeeAm. Compi. 33.
249. Answer 9 34.
250. See, e.g., Podiesny Dep. at 50; Blauert Dep. at 42-43.
251. JN Dep. at 73-74, 149.
252. SeeJN Aff. J 12.
253. SeeJN Dep. at 95-96, 106.
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Based on defendants' stated policies, it is simply inconceivable
that a serious investigation and strong punishment would not follow if
a girl of Jamie's age were pinned down and subjected to a mock sexual
assault in a classroom, or urinated on or beaten to the point of miss-
ing several days of school and requiring hospitalization. The fact that
defendants departed from their stated practices when Jamie brought
such incidents to their attention raises a genuine issue of discrimina-
tory intent.
25
The Supreme Court also has emphasized that the inquiry into
discriminatory intent "is practical. What... any official entity is 'up
to' may be plain from the results its actions achieve, or the results they
avoid. Often it is made clear from ... 'the give and take of the situa-
tion.' "255
Here, countless meetings were held during Jamie's school years at
which the anti-gay verbal harassment, continuing sexual harassment
and daily physical abuse were made known to the defendants and offi-
cials who reported to them.2  While defendants continually promised
to take care of the problem,2 1 they never seriously addressed it.
2 18
In sum, the record contains abundant direct and circumstantial
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants
intended that Jamie should not receive protection from harm and
simply had to endure relentless abuse because he is a gay boy. Sum-
259mary judgment was therefore error.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING INSUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE THAT SCHOOL OFFICIALS ENHANCED THE RISK OF
HARM TO JAMIE AND IN HOLDING THAT SCHOOLS CAN ES-
CAPE LIABILITY FOR ENCOURAGING STUDENTS TO HARM
OTHER STUDENTS; THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT AS TO EACH OF THESE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS.
A public school and its officials may be liable under Section 1983
and the Due Process Clause if they take actions that enhance the risk
254. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)
("Departures from the normal procedural sequence also might afford evidence that
improper purposes are playing a role.").
255. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.24 (1979) (citation omit-
ted).
256. See, e.g., RN Dep. at 37, 39, 41-42, 49, 64, 67-68; JN Dep. at 89-90, 146.
257. See, e.g., JN Dep. at 38, 43, 68, 146; RN Dep. at 39, 54; CN Dep. at 52.
258. See, e.g., JN Dep. at 67-68, 82-83, 121-22; JN Aff. ! 5; RN Dep. at 39, 54, 57,
72-73; CN Dep. at 66.
259. See Roger, 21 F.3d at 149.
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of harm to a student. In addition, they may be liable if, by custom,
policy or practice, they encourage a climate to flourish in which a stu-
dent suffers harm. Under both these theories of liability, the
cognizable harm is a deprivation of the liberty interest in personal se-
curity.
Although it would be impossible to catalogue and to describe
precisely each "liberty' interest protected by the Due Process
Clause, it can hardly be doubted that chief among them is the
right to some degree of bodily integrity. As the Supreme Court
recently stated: "Among the historic liberties so protected was
a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for unjus-
tified intrusions on personal security." 26°
These protections extend to "arbitrary intrusions on personal se-
curity includ[ing] both physical and emotional well-being.,
26'
An element of liability under both of these theories is deliberate
indifference on the part of the school officials. 262 This does not mean
that Jamie must show that defendants wanted him to be harmed, but
instead that officials made "a deliberate choice to follow a course of
action" which reflected deliberate indifference to his rights.2'
A. There are Genuine Issues for Trial on Jamie's
Due Process Claim That School Officials En-
hanced the Risk of Harm to Him.
As the district court recognized, a school and its officials may be
liable under Section 1983 if they enhance the risk of harm to a stu-
dent.26 The State need not create the danger but can be liable if it
"renders citizens more vulnerable to danger." 6 Specifically, the school
260. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1979) (footnote and citation omit-
ted) (reversing dismissal of case where parent sued because police officer arrested
driver of a car on a highway and left children behind in the car).
261. White, 592 F.2d at 385.
262. See Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3rd Cir. 1989) (citing
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).
263. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725 (citations omitted).
264. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 6-7; see alo Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122,
1126-27 (7th Cir. 1993).
265. Reed, 986 F.2d at 1125 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv.,
489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989)); see also Stauffer v. Orangeville Sch. Dist., No. 89-C-
20258, 1990 WL 303595, at *3 (N.D. IlM. July 31, 1990) ("By allowing Stauffer to
go to the restroom unsupervised with another student who had a prior history of
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defendants' actions or failure to take action in response to years of
abuse against Jamie enhanced the risk of harm to him and is action-
able under Section 1983. As this Circuit has observed:
We do not want to pretend that the line between action and
inaction, between inflicting and failing to prevent the inflic-
tion of harm, is dearer than it is. If the state puts a man in a
position of danger from private persons and then fails to pro-
tect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely
passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown
him into a snake pit.
266
Here, reviewing the evidence most favorably to Jamie, 67 there can
be no doubt that school officials enhanced the risk of harm to Jamie,
or rendered him "more vulnerable to danger."268 For over four years
Jamie and his parents consistently reported to the school the relentless
abuse he suffered, including the more assaultive incidents of simulated
rape, severe beatings, and being urinated and spat on. School officials
repeatedly told Jamie and his parents that they would take care of the
problem.269 Time and again, this promise was made, reassurance was
given-and yet Jamie's abusers were allowed to resume their assaults
on him. On his own, Jamie made several attempts to escape the terror
of the school, through suicide attempts and by running away, but he
was required to return to school.' 0
School officials simply did not remove, prosecute or meaningfully
discipline the abusive students, despite promises to stop the harass-
ment. Only the school, not Jamie or his parents, had disciplinary
authority over the harassers. Discipline that could have been imposed
included, at least, "detention, in-school suspension, out-of-school sus-
pension [or] expulsion"-in other words, deterrence or removal of the
perpetrators.2' In at least one incident of a boy hitting a girl, the
school expelled the boy.m But none of Jamie's attackers was ever ex-
pelled. In Jamie's case, school officials openly informed Jamie and his
sexually abusing others and who had threatened Plaintiff, it is possible that the
teacher took the affirmative act of placing Stauffer in a hazardous situation.").
266. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
267. See Roger v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 21 F.3d 146, 148-49 (7th Cir. 1994).
268. Reed, 986 F.2d at 1125 (citation omitted).
269. See, e.g., RN Dep. at 39, 43; CN Dep. at 52.
270. See RN Dep. at 64.
271. Blauert Dep. at 26 and errata.
272. See Am. Compl. 33.
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parents of their belief that he should expect to endure abuse because
he is a gay boy, which apparently explains their deliberate indiffer-
273ence.
The failure to deter Jamie's attackers from assaulting him,
through appropriate discipline, is particularly egregious given that the
school officials knew the identities of the principal abusers. Roy
Grande began abusing Jamie in the seventh grade, persisted in the
abuse and participated in the most assaultive incidents during Jamie's
nearly five-year ordeal, including the simulated rape in front of a
class,274 and the urination assault in the student bathroom. 2" Stephan
Huntley assisted Roy Grande in the urination assault by kneeing Ja-
mie to the floor,276 and it was Huntley who kicked Jamie so brutally as
to require abdominal surgery and rehospitalization for internal bleed-
ing and throwing up blood.'
Indeed, the school took more steps to degrade and isolate Jamie
than it did to punish his attackers. Far from expelling the lead perpe-
trators, for example, the school placed Jamie in the special education
class,278 when both Roy Grande and Stephan Huntley were special
education students. 79 This act was part of a pattern that highlighted
the school's message to students that abuse of a boy because he is gay
would be accommodated at his expense, not the perpetrators' expense.
The pattern included placing Jamie in different classes, placing him in
a separate part of the bus, placing him in the special education class
and forcing him to use a separate bathroom. Such affirmative acts by
the school emphasized the message that Jamie was unworthy of respect
and worthy of further abuse.
Unlike other cases considered by this Court, the harm attributed
to the State here is not from an isolated incident.20 Defendants' long
pattern of assuming the role of disciplinarian, yet returning Jamie to
his abusers without effectively disciplining them, enhanced the risk of
further harm. The abusive students received the clear message that
their verbal and physical assaults of Jamie would be tolerated, a fact
273. See Section II.B., sup ra.
274. See JN Aff. 4; JN Dep. at 72-73.
275. SeeJN Dep. at 83-84.
276. SeeJN Dep. at 83-84.
277. SeeJN Dep. at 34-36, 95-96, 107-08; RN Dep. at 68.
278. See RN Dep. at 55.
279. SeeJN Dep. at 97; Blauert Dep. at 43.
280. See, e.g., Bowers, 686 F.2d 616; Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.
1983).
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which would encourage them to continue and escalate the abuse, par-
ticulariy given their age and immaturity.8 ' The very existence of the
school's array of progressive disciplinary measures recognizes that
schoolchildren who are not given clear lines for their unacceptable
conduct will predictably persist and escalate its gravity. Yet defendants
did not use their full disciplinary powers. As a result, the abuse con-
tinued unabated until it finally drove Jamie from the school, from his
family, and from his entitlement to an education and a childhood like
everyone else's.
This case is also distinctive in that the harm occurred within the
government's domain. For example, it is not a case where government
is faulted for actions by an ex-patient off government property,282 or
for failing to pull bodies from a burning car on a highway.2 " Here, the
school is faulted for harm to a student compelled to be present on
school property, and only the school is in the position to address the
harm through discipline. In this respect, schools are a unique envi-
ronment.284 Indeed, in assuming the parents' role under the heading of
in loco parentis, schools have sought and won the right to inflict cor-
poral punishment for disciplinary reasons, which underscores the
schools' power and duty to address harms to schoolchildren.285
In addition, Jamie and his parents made repeated attempts to
take actions that were within their control. Jamie's parents made every
reasonable effort to seek a halt to the abuse of their son at school by
repeated calls and meetings. 2 6 They attempted alternate schooling. 2 1
Jamie himself, following years of reported abuse, attempted to escape
281. "When adults tolerate abusive language, the next step is often physical violence. Les-
bian and gay students are pushed, punched, and even severely beaten." Joyce Hunter
& Robert Schaecher, Gay and Lesbian Adolescents, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA oF SocAL.
WoRu 1055, 1058 (Richard L Edwards et al. eds., 19th ed. 1995).
282. See Bowers, 686 F.2d at 616.
283. See Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1200.
284. See Stauffer v. Orangeville Sch. Dist., No. 89-C-20258, 1990 WL 304250 at *6
(N.D. Ill. May 17, 1990) ("Although the State has no general duty to protect stu-
dents from the torts of third parties, this duty could conceivably be imposed under
the facts of this specific case.").
Jamie does not argue on appeal that such circumstances constitute "involuntary
custody" over him, giving rise to a predicate duty to protect him from random or
isolated harms that may or may not be anticipated. See J.O. v. Alton Community
Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990). The lack of involuntary custody
cannot, however, wholly "privatize" the school grounds.
285. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
286. See, e.g., RN Dep. at 37, 39, 41-42, 49, 64, 67-68.
287. See, e.g., RN Dep. at 36.
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the terror by running away."' He requested as a condition for return-
ing to his family and his hometown that he not be forced to return to
the abusive school environment.29 His parents agreed and attempted
home schooling but it did not work out.2" The nearby Catholic
school did not go past the eighth grade." State authorities then di-
rected Jamie's parents to return him to Ashland High School where he
had to face the terror anew.29' The terror included not only further
293
abuse but ineffective and demeaning segregation.
This Court has observed that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment could not have been thinking of due process protections
for an isolated fire, or auto accident, or a one-time careless police-
man,29 but clearly they did have in mind deliberate indifference by
state actors to violence over a sustained period of time. This Court has
further observed that the Due Process Clause is concerned more with
"negative" liberties, such as government honoring "the right to be let
alone," than with "positive liberties," such as government providing
assistance at the site of an auto accident."" By continuing to return
Jamie's abusers to school with him instead of using common discipli-
nary measures, including expulsion, and by segregating him in a
degrading and dangerous fashion, including placement in the special
education class, school officials plainly violated Jamie's "right to be let
alone." 296 The school officials here may not be the snakes in the snake-
pit, but they are as much active torifeasors as if they had thrown this
child "into a snake pit."2'
Jamie has raised a genuine issue of material fact that defendants
enhanced the risk of harm to him.298 Therefore, the district court erred
in granting summary judgment on this claim.
288. See CN Dep. at 36.
289. SeeJN Dep. at 61.
290. See CN Dep. at 67-68; RN Dep. at 61-64.
291. See RN Dep. at 44 .
292. See CN Dep. at 67-68; RN Dep. at 61-64.
293. See RN Dep. at 55; JN Dep. at 93; Blauert Dep. at 43.
294. See Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1205.
295. Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203.
296. Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203.
297. Bowers, 686 F.2d at 618.
298. See Roger, 21 F.3d at 148; Reed, 986 F.2d at 1123.
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B. Defendants Can Be Held Liable For Encour-
aging a Climate to Flourish in Which Students
Freely Abused Jamie; They Are Not Entitled to
Qualified Immunity And Genuine Issues of
Material Fact Require Reversal.
A school and its officials also may be liable under Section 1983 if
they encourage a climate to flourish in which innocent children, in-
cluding students, are victimized by others.'" "This is an independent
basis for liability ... which is unrelated to the issue decided in
DeShaney. Liability of municipal policymakers for policies or customs
chosen or recklessly maintained is not dependent upon the existence
of a 'special relationship' between the municipal officials and the indi-
viduals harmed.""
If a school's deliberately indifferent practices foster a recurrence
of abuse, the school can be liable for that harm. It is the State's action
in fostering a climate of abuse that allows liability under the Due
Process Clause and Section 1983.
The district court recognized this principle but limited its appli-
cation to circumstances in which schools or their officials encourage
teachers to harm students.'O The district court held that schools or
their officials can escape liability, despite their deliberate indifference
and its effect on other tortfeasors, if those tortfeasors are students
harming other students.02 The district court provided no reasoning
for allowing liability only when schools encourage teachers to abuse
students and courts have split on this issue."0'
Ironically, the limitation assumed by the district court appears to
resurrect the principle of respondeat superior liability, which the Su-
preme Court has held inapplicable to constitutional torts." Under
respondeat superior liability theory, a school would be vicariously liable
299. SeeJ.O.v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11,909 F.2d 267, 273 (7th Cir. 1990)
(citing Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3rd Cir. 1989)).
300. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725. See also Doe v. Paukstat, 863 F. Supp. 884, 888 (E.D.
Wis. 1994) ('Paukstaf); Doe v. Board of Educ. of Hononegah Community High
Sch. Dist. 207, 833 F. Supp. 1366, 1377-1378 (N.D. IM. 1993) ("Hononegah").
301. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 6.
302. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 6.
303. Compare Doe v. Evanston Township Consol. Sch. Dist. 202, No. 93-C-101 1, 1994
WL 55652 at *2 n.1 (N.D. IlM. Feb. 23, 1994) ("Evanston Township"), with Elliot v.
New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
304. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
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for the conduct of teachers (and other employees) but not for the
conduct of students. However, in recognizing municipal liability un-
der Section 1983, the Supreme Court expressly rejected respondeat
superior as a basis for liability.
The reasoning of Monell explains why the district court erred
here. The Monell Court, in rejecting the imposition of liability based
solely on the employer/employee relationship, concluded that liability
of a municipal employer for constitutional torts arises not from the
employment of a tortfeasor, but from the fact that the municipality
"causes" a tortfeasor to harm another." The relevant factor for liabil-
ity is causation, not the employment relationship between the
municipal entity and the tortfeasor.3 6 A municipality may cause either
its employees or a private actor to harm a person. Accordingly, the
municipality's liability for its own actions should not turn on whether
its joint tortfeasor is an employee or not. The district court's holding
is grounded upon theories of vicarious liability and cannot stand.s'0
The authority for the district court's holding.. consists of a Third
Circuit opinion and a district court opinion which follows it, neither
of which offer reasons to warrant contradicting Monell and applying
the principle of respondeat superior.? Specifically, the court relied
upon the Third Circuit's observation that Section 1983 liability may
not lie where "private actors committed the underlying violative
acts. ' 0 But, as shown above, this view cannot be reconciled with Mo-
nell, which established that municipal liability turns on causation
(where the municipality is a joint tortfeasor), not upon vicarious li-
ability (where the municipality is not a joint tortfeasor). It is therefore
irrelevant whether state actors or private actors committed the under-
lying violative act, as long as the municipality provided part of the
cause for the act."'
305. See Mondl 436 U.S. at 692.
306. The very language of Section 1983---"shal subject, or cause to be subjected, any per-
son"-suggests that the employer/employee relationship is not relevant. Monel4 436
U.S. at 691 (emphasis added). The Court held this language "suggests that Congress
did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent." Monel4
436 U.S. at 692.
307. See Evanston Tounship, 1994 WL 55652 at *2 n.1.
308. See Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 7-8.
309. See D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d 1364 (3rd Cir. 1992) ("Middle Bucks");
Elliot, 799 F. Supp. at 823.
310. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1376.
311. In Middle Bucks, the facts suggest that notice to the school of the harm was limited to
one report of one incident, which provides comparatively uncertain ground on which
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Based upon the review of the facts in the above section concern-
ing the enhancement of the risk of harm, genuine issues of material
fact exist concerning whether or not there was a practice by appellees
that fostered a climate in which Jamie was harmed."' The district
court's grant of summary judgment on the merits should therefore be
reversed.
The district court also erred in ruling that even if liability existed
for school officials encouraging students to harm Jamie, the right to
be free from physical abuse by private actors "was not clearly estab-
lished at the time defendants conduct occurred, and defendants would
be entitled to qualified immunity.""' This plainly is not true as a
matter of law with respect to the School District." The court also
erred in granting qualified immunity to the individual defendants be-
cause the right Jamie asserts was clearly established.
It is not seriously contended that Jamie did not have a constitu-
tional right to attend school without suffering physical abuse as well as
sexual and verbal harassment. The Supreme Court, in considering the
closely analogous right implicated by corporal punishment in schools,
held that "among the historic liberties ... protected [by the Due
Process Clause] was a right to be free from ... unjustified intrusions
on personal security."315 Encouraging physical abuse of a student "is
an intrusion of the schoolchild's bodily integrity not substantively
different for constitutional purposes from corporal punishment by
teachers."' 6 Therefore, Jamie's constitutional right to be free of cer-
tain emotional and physical abuse was clearly established by 1977, the
date of the Ingraham decision. Indeed, since physical abuse of a stu-
dent "could not possibly be deemed an acceptable practice, as some
view teacher-inflicted corporal punishment, a student's right to be free
from such molestation may be viewed as clearly established even be-
fore Ingraham."
317
to argue that the school in fact "caused" the students to harm other students. See
Middle Bucks, 971 F.2d at 1366, 1376.
312. See Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725 ("[A]ppellants' argument that there was no policy,
custom or practice is a merits issue, which we cannot resolve on this interlocutory ap-
peal.").
313. Nabozny, No. 95-C-086-S at 9 (citing HarlowY. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
314. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 650.
315. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 673 (1977).
316. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 727.
317. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 727 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)
("substantive due process violation occurs where conduct 'shocks the conscience'")).
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Here the emotional and physical abuse encouraged by the school
officials through their perpetual failure to remove Jamie's harassers or
impose any meaningful disciplinary measures, and through the segrega-
tion of Jamie (eventually into the special education class with his
principal assailants), dearly rises to the level of unconstitutional harm.
Reasonable persons would have known that such conduct is unconsti-
tutional and not entitled to qualified immunity."'
The district court put too much emphasis upon whether defendants
should have known they could be liable to Jamie for their role in
fomenting the conduct of Jamie's classmates. In Triad Associates,3 9 the
Court made clear that the issue is "the legality of the conduct of the public




"Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would
violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate;
and a person who suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause
of action.32' There -should indeed be hesitation in the mind of any public
school official considering the encouragement of plainly illegal student
harassment and physical assaults.
Likewise, there should be no concern for offending the underlying
purpose of qualified immunity, which is to prevent fear of unjustified
lawsuits from hampering school officials who act responsibly in the dis-
charge of their duties,322 because it is difficult to envision responsible
school officials encouraging over four years of abuse in the manner de-
scribed. Therefore, the lower court erred in raising the shield of
qualified immunity on defendants' behalf.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, plaintiff-appellant Jamie Nabozny
respectfully asks the Court to reverse the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment on his equal protection and due process claims and to
remand to the district court for further discovery and trial.
DATED: December 18, 1995
318. See Triad Assoc., Inc. v. Robinson, 10 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1993) (no require-
ment of factually identical case).
319. TriadAssoc., 10 F.3d at 498-500.
320. TriadAssoc., 10 F.3d at 499.
321. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1981).
322. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
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